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The words "international law" are 
apt to draw a wry smile from the man in 
the street-and our present involvement 
in Vietnam merely gives more twist to 
the smile which would have been there 
before. To the layman, to the reader of 
newspapers and reporters of interna· 
tional events, intemationallaw conjures 
up a mature legal system-one in which 
an established legislature makes laws, an 
executive carries them out, a judiciary 
presides over trials of persons charged 
with infractions of those laws, and a 
sheriff stands ready to place a convicted 
violator in jail and keep him there. The 
layman knows that no such system or 
its counterpart exists in the interna· 
tional arena, controlling the relation· 
ships between states. He is reminded 
almost daily of the essentially lawless 
behavior of certain states in the interna· 
tional community, and accordingly (and 
for this purpose this probably means 
most of you in the audience) he comes 
to think of international law as a lot of 
words and academic concepts and argu· 
ments unrelated to the realities of world 
forces and power politics. He tends to 
dismiss this material as having no signifi· 
cant effect or impact, as providing no 
significant assistance towards or guaran-
tee of peace, or of a context in which 
the individual states can go about the 
business of government. He thinks of 
international relations basically as a 
function or problem in the exercise of 
power, and in comparative power, with 
spheres of particular interest or influ-
ence. 
One of the objectives of this study is 
to suggest to you that such a layman's 
view may be somewhat out of focus, 
and that military planning and strategy 
demand an understanding and apprecia-
tion of the real strengths and utility of 
international law as well as of its real 
weaknesses and shortcomings. 
But, as a preliminary step to embark-
ing on any analysis of international law, 
it is necessary to establish what it is not. 
When we think of a legal system (and 
the words "international law" suggest a 
reference to such a system), we are 
almost certain to borrow from the legal 
system we know and project it as far as 
possible into the next context. The 
essential flaw in a layman's approach to 
an appreciation of international law 
frequently lies in such an extension. The 
legal system we know constitutes the 
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backbone of our society, and without it 
none of us would have any security or 
freedom of person or of property. Per-
sonal freedom would be meaningless 
and property would be useless to us 
without a system of protection and 
vindication of our rights. The existence 
of a mechanism for vindication pre-
supposes a tribunal with authority to 
adjudicate the existence and extent of 
such rights as well as of a system for 
enforcement of any rulings made by 
such a tribunal. It usually is said that 
the maturity of a society, and the rod 
for measuring the progress made from 
the primitive state, is found in its legal 
system and its operational efficacy. 
What comparable institutions currently 
exist in the international arena? 
There is no organization comparable 
to the Congress having substantial legis-
lative competence with right to pass 
laws binding upon the individual states 
of the world. And we are a long way 
from the type of international con-
sensus or common ground which would 
constitute a necessary prerequisite for 
the creation of any such organization. 
Just ask yourselves how much agree-
ment it would be possible to master 
among states at the present time on 
such an organization's authority to legis-
late on allocation of world resources 
and materials, including water, distribu-
tion of population surpluses, and food-
stuffs. The present chances of a signifi-
cant number of states agreeing to confer 
such legislative authority on an interna-
tional organization must be slight in-
deed. The European Community, or 
Common Market, represents a remark-
able step in that direction taken by the 
six West European states involved. But 
the successes -as well as the .difficulties 
of that union indicate the scope of the 
problems confronting efforts to extend 
further such a union. 
How does the United Nations com-
pare to an international legislature? 
Some critics of our participation in the 
United Nations have charged that our 
membership in and adherence to that 
organization amount to giving up na-
tional sovereignty and control in signifi-
cant areas. Were that charge true, then 
the United Nations might be, at the 
present time, a form of international 
legislature of limited authority-but it is 
not. In ratifying the Charter of the 
United Nations, we undertook to con-
form our conduct to the standards and 
requirements of that landmark treaty, 
but it does not commit us to acceptance 
of binding decisions in significant areas 
without our own future consent. The 
authority of the General Assembly, at 
least as illustrated by the 20 years of its 
practice, is advisory rather than binding. 
Actions such as the U.N. intervention in 
the Congo might suggest a greater 
authority, but reflection will suggest 
that participation by the states supply-
ing troops was dependent on their indi-
vidual willingness to do so. In an ad-
visory opinion in 1962, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice rules that other 
members of the United Nations were 
obliged to contribute their rated share 
to the cost of such operations. Subse-
quent political decision in the As-
sembly, however, has undercut the judg-
ment handed down by the Court; it 
would seem that a political compromise 
has been achieved falling short of ad-
herence to any compulsory duty to 
contribute in such a case. 
The Security Council, on the other 
hand, is provided with authority to 
hand down binding rulings in certain 
limited situations. On paper, this au-
thority of the Security Council appears 
to give it limited legislative competence. 
In practice, the well-known veto power 
insisted on by the Russians (and equally 
essential to original participation by the 
other great powers), reduces that bind-
ing authority to nearly zero so far as the 
five powers with a veto are concerned. 
For states other than the big five, it 
might be thought that the Security 
Council possesses significant legislative 
authority. In fact, international disputes 
involve two or more parties-it usually 
takes two to tango. This being the case, 
the likelihood of both or all participants 
finding a friend among the veto powers 
is rather substantial. 
For these reasons, in terms of a 
realistic appraisal, we cannot regard the 
United Nations as having significant 
obligatory legislative authority. We are 
parties to a variety of other treaties 
which create organizations with special 
limited authority to make binding rules. 
But the limit of competence of these 
organizations is specialized and narrow, 
not touching the major issues of interna-
tional peace. 
Just as there is no real international 
counterpart for Congress, so there is no 
real international counterpart for our 
courts or judicial and law enforcement 
system. The International Court of 
Justice is a unique institution. If I wish 
to sue my neighbor because he damaged 
my property, I can invoke the assistance 
of a court without his consenting to be 
sued by me in that court. This is not so 
with the International Court. In suits 
between individual states, the ICJ au-
thority is dependent upon agreement by 
both or all parties that the Court hear 
the case. The Statute of the Court 
makes provision for states to indicate in 
advance of any particular dispute that 
they accept the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the Court. Most such acceptances, 
however, have been rather carefully 
qualified by the states filing them. Thus, 
in the celebrated Connolly amendment 
to the United States declaration con-
cerning the jurisdiction of the Court, it 
is provided that the United States re-
serves the right itself to decide whether 
certain types of suit are within or 
outside the jurisdiction of the Court. 
This gives us in many cases the ability to 
decide, after suit has been brought, 
whether we will allow it to continue. 
Pretty smart, you say. Well, unfortu-
nately, this means that if we wish to sue 
any other country in that Court, it gets 
the benefit of a similar veto over the 
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Court's jurisdiction. If the United States 
is not prepared to make a more general 
commitment to the authority of the 
International Court, it goes without 
saying that a number of other states are 
prepared even less. 
True, the International Court does 
have another kind of jurisdiction: its 
so-called advisory jurisdiction. The 
General Assembly, the Security Council, 
and certain other organs of the United 
Nations can ask the Court for an 
opinion on an allegedly hypothetical 
question. The Court's opinion on 
whether the Soviet Union and other 
countries were obligated to contribute 
towards the cost of the Middle East and 
Congo operations came before the 
Court under this authority. The opinion 
given under such jurisdiction is advisory 
in name as well as in political reality; 
the organ requesting it is not bound to 
follow it, nor are the individual states. 
In sum, it is clear that in the interna-
tional context not only is there no 
substantial counterpart to the Congress, 
but also there is no substantial counter-
part to our judicial system. How then 
can we speak of a subject called "inter-
national law"? Austin once defined law 
as the command of a sovereign. By this 
he meant that before you could have 
law you must have a body with au-
thority to make law or rules of conduct, 
and, in addition, you must have the 
machinery necessary to enforce those 
rules when they are made. Clearly, in 
the Austinian sense, we have no such 
thing as international law_ What, then, 
do we have, and why is it called 
"international law"? 
To work towards answers to these 
questions, it is necessary to go back to 
our domestic concept of a legal system. 
We have laws prohibiting one person 
from assaulting another or taking his 
property by force. We have laws requir-
ing automobiles to be driven according 
to specified requirements. The existence 
of these laws does not guarantee that 
certain individuals will not break them 
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and thereby expose themselves to prose-
cution. For most of us under most 
circumstances, however, what is im-
portant in terms of the way we live our 
everyday lives is that most people do 
obey the requirements of these_ laws. 
Most people do drive on the right side 
of the road (with the notable exception 
of the English) and most people do not 
assault others or attempt to take their 
property away by force_ If a significant 
number of the people in this country 
began to violate these laws steadily, our 
system of order would break down, 
notwithstanding the backup threat of 
prosecution of the violators. Laws or 
rules are significant in our daily lives, 
therefore, because we safely can predict 
that others will obey them, and we can 
plan our own actions and lives on the 
premise that they will be broadly 
obeyed. For these reasons, one school 
of thought defines law as a system of 
rules and orders for the mutual benefit 
of the members of society, which rules 
and orders are generally followed and 
obeyed. In this sense, we have a signifi-
cant amount of international law but it 
is of the utmost importance to hear in 
mind that the reason why there is 
habitual behavior consistent with the 
rules is mutual benefit and not the 
threat of a policeman or a sheriff. You 
have the international rules of naviga-
tion-what would happen to navigation 
of shipping without habitual observance 
of those rules? If you think of interna-
tional law as that body of custom and 
experience which has grown up or 
evolved from consideration of regula-
tion required for the common benefit 
and estimate the strength of any par-
ticular rule in any particular case in 
terms of the reciprocal interest of the 
other state or states in maintaining 
adherence to that rule, you will come 
closer to an understanding and apprecia-
tion of what international law means, to 
what extent it can be relied upon, and 
to what extent it must be taken into 
account in planning action or strategy. 
If, at the same time, you bear in mind 
the old adage about the importance of 
acting consistently, you will come even 
closer. If the United States takes the 
position today that the rule of conduct 
in a particular situation is one thing, and 
tomorrow takes an entirely different 
and possibly inconsistent position from 
that taken the day before, you can see 
easily that other states are less likely to 
be prepared to follow or accept either 
yesterday's statement of the rule or 
to day's statement of them. The im-
portance of acting consistently, there-
fore, requires each state in any particu-
lar situation to think not only of the 
immediate problem and what might be 
done with it, but also to think of the 
precedent (as lawyers call it) which any 
particular action might create. In ana-
lyzing action in any particular situation, 
it is most important to put ourselves in 
the shoes of the other state or states 
involved, and then ask how the particu-
lar rule we urge might be used by them 
in another context. Let me give you an 
illustration. If we claim that it is per-
missible to stop shipping on the high 
seas to see whether arms are being 
carried to the Viet Cong aboard the 
vessels stopped, what happens if the 
Russians claim to have a reciprocal right 
to stop our shipping in the Caribbean 
area to see whether it is carrying sup-
plies usable by revolutionaries seeking 
the overthrow of the Castro regime? It 
is difficult obviously for us to assert a 
right to stop and search shipping on the 
high seas for particular purposes with-
out according a similar right in similar 
situations to other states. This element 
in analysis we sometimes call mutuality 
or reciprocity, and, if you stop to think 
for a moment, you can see that a similar 
concept underlies many of our own 
everday dealings. 
The importance and significance of 
this element of reciprocity or mutuality 
in international affairs is seen most 
easily in the more mundane transactions 
and events of everyday affairs. Suppose 
that a U.S. corporation is thinking of 
establishing a fairly large business in 
Venezuela or Brazil, of building a fac-
tory, of establishing a stock of merchan-
dise for sale and distribution from there 
through other Latin-American coun-
tries. Among the things it must consider 
are the following: Can it get permission 
to come in? Will its personnel be 
allowed to enter and leave the country 
and travel freely? Will their lives and 
safety be assured? Will the company's 
capital investment be fairly protected? 
And, nowadays, will a fair method of 
taxation be used and applied both to 
the corporation and its personnel by the 
host state? American companies are 
going abroad every day and setting up 
such establishments precisely because 
rather precise rules of international law 
apply to regulate the rights and duties 
of the corporation and the rights and 
duties of the host country. The element 
of mutuality and reciprocal interest for 
the host country as well as for the 
United States is clear. 
What, then, is the source of interna-
tional law which provides this measure 
of assurance and predictability? If there 
is no international legislature, where 
does this law come from and how is its 
content ascertained? The answer is from 
at least two more or less distinct 
sources: treaties or agreements entered 
into between states, and the so-called 
general, customary, or "common" inter-
national law. 
Customary international law claims 
to be a distillation of the experience of 
states over at least the last 500 years. It 
purports to have as its core or basis 
those practices, those rules, which have 
been observed and followed habitually 
by states in their dealings with other 
states. Now you will notice that in 
talking about international law, I am 
talking about a state dealing with an-
other state. I am not talking about an 
individual of one state dealing with an 
individual of another state, and there is 
a reason for this. International law says 
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(right or wrong and for whatever rea-
son) that this whole body of learning 
has to do with the relationships between 
states, not between individuals. ThIS 
approach is beginning to break down, 
but at least the historical material em-
phasizes heavily, just as the Interna-
tional Court Statute emphasizes, that 
the parties who are concerned with 
international law are the states of this 
world, not their individual citizens as 
such. 
Let me give you a couple of illustra-
tions of rules of customary international 
law. Castro broke one of them in 
confiscating American property in 
Cuba. There is a rule of general interna-
tionallaw which states that it is unlaw-
ful to take someone's property without 
paying just compensation for it. There is 
another standard which says (these are 
generalizations, the rules are more 
precise than this) that a state is required 
to provide minimum acceptable levels of 
protection for visiting aliens-not less 
than national standards, and sometimes 
more. 
Now you may think this pretty 
nebulous stuff: states change, govern-
ments change, and governmental atti-
tudes to these rules doubtless change, 
too. As a matter of fact, one of the 
biggest problems at the present time is 
that many of the new nations do not 
think very highly of many of the stand-
ards established by the older nations, 
primarily from western Europe. A con-
siderable argument is going on con-
cerning just how sound and how good 
and how reliable for purposes of predic-
tion some of these rules of international 
law are. But one of the interesting 
features of customary international law 
is the flexibility that it has. 
Now, as you know, many of the rules 
of law which govern your everyday 
lives-for instance, the law which 
governs your protection against people 
negligently injuring you-are general 
rules not to be found in statutes at all. 
They are found in the decisions of 
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courts, built up into a consistent body 
of practice through case-by-case adjudi-
cation. They are an important part of 
our domestic legal system and provde 
some analogy for customary interna-
tionallaw. 
The second, and probably the far 
more important source of international 
law rules, is the treaties or agreements 
which states make. The United States is 
a party to some 6,000 treaties with the 
other countries of the world. These 
treaties, of which the U.N. Charter is 
one, run the gamut from broad political 
treaties, including military defense 
agreements, through trade and com-
merce treaties, through tax agreements, 
to agreements fixing the size and nature 
of visiting military missions. Obviously, 
these treaties are of greatly varying 
importance to our national interest. 
Less obviously, but equally clearly, 
these treaties are negotiated and worded 
with widely differing standards of pre-
cision and clarity of meaning. A treaty 
establishing the appropriate taxing 
power of the two countries party to it 
can be expected to be drawn with 
technical precision and detail. A politi-
cal treaty expressing friendship between 
two countries and suggesting that they 
will take a common view and common 
policy in matters of military action and 
defense will use broad and nebulous 
standards. And, if you have any ques-
tion, look at the language of the SEATO 
treaty and the statements there about 
the circumstances under which one 
party may come to the defense of 
another. 
In other words, some kinds of 
treaties establish a relatively clear and 
definite list of rights and duties for both 
or all parties, and the statement leaves 
little room for interpretation or dif-
ference of opinion about the scope and 
extent of those rights and duties. Others 
are deliberately framed in language so 
general as in reality to create no rights 
or duties. 
Where, in this scale of things, does 
the U.N. Charter fall? Article 51 of the 
Charter provides that: 
Nothing in the present Charter 
shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-
defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Coun-
cil has taken the measures neces-
sary to maintain international 
peace and security .... 
Our position in Vietnam is, in part, 
premised on this article; we are engaging 
in collective self-defense of the Republic 
of Vietnam against external aggression. 
But the Communist countries take a 
different view of the meaning of this 
article, as do some writers and speakers 
in this country, including some of those 
critical of our current policies. In the 
event of disagreement over the meaning 
of article 51, where do we go to find the 
"true" meaning of the Charter? If you 
and I sign a contract for the sale of my 
house to you, and we disagree as to the 
meaning of one of its terms, we go to 
court to find out which of us is right. In 
the absence of an International Court 
with binding jurisdiction, where do we 
go for an authoritative interpretation of 
our treaty commitments? Are we forced 
to the conclusion that our 6,000-odd 
treaties and agreements are useless be-
cause there is no tribunal with compul-
sory jurisdiction to interpret and apply 
them? Common sense suggests the 
answer is no-otherwise, why would our 
State Department so sedulously go 
about negotiating new ones, like the 
Test Ban Treaty? 
Once again, the answer comes back 
to practicalities and not theoretical 
possibilities. In everyday international 
life, states usually, and in fact almost 
invariably, keep those treaty commit-
ments of the kind which get framed 
with some degree of precision. And the 
reason is clearly one of mutual interest. 
Cuba violated treaties as well as cus-
tomary law in confiscating American 
property interests without compen-
sation. She is paying the price by 
finding out how difficult it is for her 
now to get development capital. 
But it must be realized that as the 
subject matter of a given treaty ap-
proaches more nearly to the vital inter-
ests of a country, so increases the 
unwillingness of the country to make a 
precise binding commitment for the 
future, and so increases the danger of 
any commitment receiving a forced in-
terpretation to suit the particular tastes 
of the interpreter. The degree of se-
curity, certainty and predictability 
found in commercial matters between 
states on friendly terms diminishes 
sharply when the treaty is one between 
less friendly states and involves more 
vital interests or subject matter. Many 
of the commitments set forth in the 
U.N. Charter do involve vital national 
interests. Accordingly, competing and 
divergent interpretations frequently 
are urged as to the nature and content 
of those obligations. The issues creating 
the problems of interpretation are more 
apt to arise between relatively hostile 
states or groups of states so that the 
factors of mutuality and reciprocity are 
likely to be minimized. Threats or acts 
of reprisal by the Russians are unlikely 
to influence our action or interpretation 
of a particular Charter provision. The 
quid pro quo or mutuality is here 
hardest to see. In this context of diver-
gent claims and interpretations of the 
Charter, what good does law or legal 
interpretation of the Charter as a treaty 
do us? Does the Charter have any real 
meaning, any real significance, if the 
different protagonists can interpret it to 
suit themselves? 
Let me illustrate this problem. In 
1956, an Emergency Force for the 
Middle East was set up pursuant to U.N. 
resolutions. In 1960, a somewhat similar 
force was dispatched to the Congo 
likewise pursuant to U.N. resolutions. 
The Soviet Union refused to make any 
contribution to the large costs of either 
force as did a number of other U.N. 
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members. France refused to pay a nickel 
towards the costs of the Congo opera· 
tion. The U.S.S.R. gave as its reason 
that these forces were constituted ille-
gally, since only the Security Council 
had authority to use force or direct the 
use of force and only the Security 
Council had authority to allocate any 
consequent expenses. We advanced the 
legal argument that article 17 of the 
Charter gave the General Assembly the 
necessary authority to, in effect, tax the 
members to cover the costs of these 
operations. Here, then, you had the 
interesting situation of both the United 
States and the Soviet Union earnestly 
advancing and pressing detailed legal 
arguments as to the meaning of the 
charter. Why should either, why should 
both have been concerned to advance 
arguments of this sort? What did either 
hope to gain or stand to gain? Eventu-
ally, the General Assembly, by majority 
vote, requested the advisory opinion of 
the International Court on this issue. 
What was the supposed object of this 
move? Who would stand to gain from 
such an opinion, whichever way it 
went? The Court finally decided by a 
9-5 majority that our interpretation was 
correct. Who, then, gained from this 
decision? As far as I know, the Russians 
still have to pay their first nickel 
towards the costs of those operations. 
In problems of this importance and 
complexity, affecting vital national in-
terests, the answer appears to be that a 
complicated game of chess is being 
played. Obviously, both sides feel that 
something is to be gained by making as 
persuasive an argument as possible; obvi-
ously, both feel that there is a market to 
be persuaded; obviously, both see goals 
or objects the attainment of which 
merits investing in the best available 
legal argument in order to maximize the 
persuasiveness of their particular posi-
tion. And, yet, this species of psycho-
logical warfare leaves the layman or 
newspaper reader somewhat confused. 
He clings tenaciously to the belief or 
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hope that law, treaties, and the meaning 
of treaty commitments are immutables 
of fixed, definite, and precise meaning. 
That hope or belief is just as false in the 
international arena as it is in the domes-
tic arena, as illustrated by some of the 
landmark disputes of recent years which 
tested the meaning of our own Constitu-
tion. 
In the context of Vietnam, this 
aspect of psychological warfare is being 
played and played hard by both sides. It 
is being played hard by forces of differ-
ing viewpoints right within this very 
United States, as you all know. And so 
you are apt to conclude: this is a 
business for experts, for legal officers of 
senior rank responsible for advising our 
government and the President. What 
does it have to do with the military 
officer, even of most senior rank? 
The answer to that question varies 
through something like the same spec-
trum as treaties vary, as I suggested 
earlier. Rather clearly, it is a matter of 
interest but not of professional responsi-
bility for the senior military officer to 
be well informed about the legal basis of 
our position in Vietnam. The Legal 
Adviser to the State Department has 
issued a lengthy paper on that subject 
which may provide guidance. The mili-
tary officer is entitled to rely on the 
task being done well by that office. But 
suppose that the question is: May I or 
should I, as commanding officer of a 
destroyer, intercept shipping on the 
high seas destined, as I believe, for the 
Viet Cong? Here, you may say, there is 
another answer available to relieve the 
commanding officer. Either the problem 
may be covered by orders, issued from 
above, or such orders may be obtained 
quickly by single sideband. Once again, 
someone with authority and legal ex-
perience will have considered the inter-
national law problems, if any, and will 
have supplied adequate guidance for the 
destroyer skipper. The large element of 
truth in this last answer cannot be 
denied. The problems of a commanding 
officer which can be foreseen in advance 
are fairly easily answered by preestab-
lished orders or guidelines. Trouble is 
apt to come, however, in those situa-
tions which have not been foreseen, or 
are not covered in orders, or as to which 
a measure of discretion (large or nar-
row) is left within the orders. In this 
context, as in any other executive situa-
tion, the officer or person charged with 
carrying out policy or orders must have 
some substantial appreciation of the 
policy underlying his orders in order to 
be in a position to implement them as 
well as possible. And the skipper here, 
as in other situations, has little room for 
error. As commander of a commissioned 
naval vessel, his acts may engage directly 
the responsibility of the United States 
whether or not his actions are within or 
beyond the scope of his orders. Failure 
to act may be just as bad as acting too 
vigorously, particularly in circumstances 
in which, under Navy Regulations, he is 
charged with the duty of protecting 
American lives and commercial in-
terests. But this, and other provisions of 
Navy Regulations, would seem to re-
quire the skipper to be a "seaIawyer." 
Confronted with what may seem an 
impossible burden requiring legal skills 
you have not received, you may throw 
up your hands. You may regard these 
regulations as a basis for charging a 
scapegoat if the necessity for finding 
one arises. There may be a scintilla of 
truth in both these propositions. Cer-
tainly, no one imagines that you can be 
given a serious foundation in the sub-
stantive content of international law in 
the course of this seven-day study. 
Former classes have experienced a 
measure of frustration over this-some 
have felt that the instructors and the 
College have presented intemationallaw 
as something which the officer is re-
quired, by appropriate regulations, to 
have a working knowledge of, and yet 
he cannot possibly obtain that knowl-
edge from the brief time allotted to its 
study. The consultants who have come 
for this program, in government service 
and academics both, have invested a 
goodly number of years in studying this 
material You, as classes before you 
have discovered, will find that they have 
a great fondness for argument and little 
comparable fondness for clear and 
direct answers. Blame this on their legal 
training and experience. But do not go 
away thinking that the uncertainties, 
the doubts, and the large scope for 
argument make this subject a matter of 
debate only. It is quite unrealistic to 
suppose that, in the space of this short 
study, you can become international 
lawyers; and you should not be dis-
concerted when, at its end, you decide 
that you have mastered little, if any, of 
the substance of international law. 
What you should derive from this 
study is an introduction or background, 
a viewpoint or perspective, of what 
international law is all about, how it can 
affect and does affect national policy, 
the kinds of influence it can exert on 
policy and strategy, and some feel for 
the varying significance of international 
law imputs in varying situations. As 
background, this study is certain to be 
of significance to future work you may 
do in planning operations. Many of you, 
in the near future (or indeed in the 
immediate past), will be preparing 
operational plans, and your choices or 
alternatives and the reasons for chosing 
between them well may be affected by 
considerations of international law. In 
short, you have been or will be respon-
sible for initial preparation of the plans 
which carry with them the instructions 
to the skipper or other commander on 
the line. Here, your interest in this 
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subject matter becomes much more 
obvious and direct. Suppose, for 
instance, that you had been assigned to 
work on preparation of orders covering 
Operation Market-Time. While you 
would expect to go to JAG for help on 
available international law, you would 
still want to be in a position yourself to 
appraise and orient the advice you 
receive and correlate it to your opera-
tional plan. 
Let me summarize for a moment. 
The international law which you most 
likely are to be concerned with in 
planning is the body of material affect-
ing rather vital national interests. This is 
the material, within the broad field of 
international h.w, which is most volatile 
and relatively uncertain, in which ap-
proaches and attitudes may be more 
important than knowledge of specific 
treaty provisions or precedents from the 
past, in which balanced consideration of 
varying arguments may be required. 
This aspect of international law does 
contain great uncertainty, as well as 
great capacity for flux and change. It is 
worthwhile remembering that other 
areas of international law, less closely 
identified with basic national interest 
and peace but fundamentally important 
to everyday international exchange and 
trade, are much more certain in their 
content and much more reliable in state 
conformity of conduct to those stand-
ards. Status-of-forces agreements, for 
instance, are carried out every day-
many of you will be familiar with some 
of the details of cases involving mem-
bers of a crew or other contingent 
involved with local authorities in an-
other country. 
----tfi----
